Topic: Asylum · Sources: Supreme Court opinion, legal analysis

On June 25, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Mullin v. Al Otro Lado (No. 25-5), by a 6–3 vote, that under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a person “arrives in the United States” only when they actually cross the border. Someone stopped on the Mexican side of an official port of entry and not allowed onto U.S. soil is not, under these provisions, entitled to the inspection and asylum-access arguments the plaintiffs raised (policies often described as metering or turnbacks).

This is a different case from the TPS decision issued the same day—Mullin v. Doe (No. 25-1083). Headlines and site feeds should not blend the two without labeling each one.

What was at stake

Al Otro Lado and individual plaintiffs challenged practices under which people seeking protection at legal border crossings were physically blocked from entering the United States and left in dangerous conditions in Mexico. The government sought confirmation that it could resume such policies when it chooses.

The majority (opinion by Samuel Alito, joined by Roberts, Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett) rejected the idea that “arrival” occurs before entry when a person is held at the boundary. The dissent (Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson) offered a competing reading of the statute and warned about consequences for asylum access.

Official opinion: Supreme Court, No. 25-5 (PDF). Congressional Research Service summary: CRS LSB11443.

Why some experts say the majority “misreads” border processing

Alongside the holding on “arrives,” immigration scholars are scrutinizing how Justice Alito’s opening discussion portrays routine border processing and expedited removal—the fast-track procedure that can remove certain arrivals without a hearing before an immigration judge.

Under the INA itself, expedited removal does not apply to every person an officer finds inadmissible. In general terms, it targets specific categories of arrivals without valid documentation or with material misrepresentation; the statute also requires that if a person states an intent to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of persecution, the officer must not simply proceed with standard expedited removal—they must be referred for screening and further asylum steps (including an asylum-officer interview). The Court’s opinion addresses those limits elsewhere; critics argue the opening narrative suggests that most inadmissible people are quickly expelled through expedited removal, which overstates how the statutory scheme is structured.

Jonathan Weinberg, Distinguished Professor of Law at Wayne State University, described the practical concern in commentary reported by SCOTUSblog (published shortly after the decision):

“Justice Alito’s statement would take away from people seeking to enter the country—and some people already in it—their only opportunity to have their case heard by a neutral adjudicator. Instead, it would allow border officials to eject anyone seeking to enter the country, and impose a five-year bar on their returning, on the basis of their own mere say-so untethered in law.”

That line of criticism does not undo the Court’s formal holding on metering and “arrives.” It targets the framing of border law in the majority opinion and the downstream arguments advocates and scholars may make about unchecked officer discretion and loss of neutral review for people who do cross the border but are processed under expedited-removal rules.

Similar themes appear in independent analysis, e.g. Just Security (June 28, 2026), which argues the decision effectively empowers turnbacks despite congressional asylum structure and discusses Alito’s treatment of the 1996 expedited-removal regime.

How this fits the bigger asylum picture

  • Holding (majority): No statutory right to asylum processing for people still outside the United States at the Mexican side of the border; officers are not required to “inspect” them as arriving applicants in that situation.

  • Policy context: Litigation over metering and physical turnbacks at ports of entry—not the full story of credible fear screening, affirmative asylum, or defensive asylum in immigration court after entry.

  • Scholarly critique: Whether Alito’s description of default expedited removal matches INA text—and what that implies for due process and immigration court roles going forward.

Advocacy groups (e.g. CGRS, Florence Project) condemned the ruling as a severe setback for asylum at ports of entry. That is advocacy perspective, not a substitute for reading the opinion.

For readers of this library

This article explains what the Court decided and one major expert/analytic line about the majority’s border narrative. It does not tell you whether you may seek asylum, how to approach a port of entry, or what to do if you were turned back. Those outcomes depend on individual facts and current DHS/CBP policy.

Further on this site (Asylum hub): TPS vs. asylum; credible fear in general terms; news on border policy.
Official background: USCIS — Asylum, CBP.